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BOOK REVIEWS 
THE COURT YEARS, 1939 to 1975 : The Autobiography of Wil- 
liam 0. Douglas, by William 0. Douglas, New York: Random 
House, 1980. Pp. xi, 434. $16.95. -At a time when Canadian 
lawyers are debating the merits and demerits of constitutional re- 
form, and specifically the entrenchment of a Charter of Human 
Rights, the story of the judicial career of an American jurist who 
sat as a Justice of the United States Supreme Court during four 
decades should have made for enlightening and provocative read- 
ing. Mr. Justice William 0. Douglas's sculpting of constitutional 
rights in a society remarkably similar to our own might have pro- 
vided the reader with an enormous wealth of information as to the 
role of a Supreme Court as a constitutional institution. In particular, 
the autobiography of Justice Douglas might have offered the reader 
a remarkably candid view of the role of the Supreme Court, and of 
its members, in the creation and transformation of constitutional 
values during three wars, seven presidents, and two decades of in- 
ternal civil crisis in the United States. Our own debate has con- 
scientiously ignored both the potential role of the Supreme Court of 
Canada and the nature and character of the Canadian judiciary in 
the forthcoming era of constitutional litigation. Nowhere in the 
proposed constitution does one find reference to the existence of the 
Court, to the process of judicial appointment, or to the method of 
judicial removal. Yet the proposed Charter of Human Rights leaves 
enormous scope for judicial activism, creativity or reactionism as the 
case may be. One might have suspected that the story of Mr. Justice 
Douglas's judicial career would have offered considerable insight as 
to the issues which Canadians ought to be facing now, and it is dis- 
appointing that this autobiography fails to meet that goal. 
Before engaging in constitutional theorizing, however, one must 
understand the place of this autobiography. It is the second of two 
parts. Go East, Young Man: The Early Years: the autobiography 
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of William 0. Douglas published almost six years ago, detailed 
Douglas's youth in Washington state, his law school education, 
teaching at Columbia and Yale, and chairmanship of the Securities 
Exchange Commission under President Roosevelt. It made fascinat- 
ing reading, offering insight into the character, intellect and emo- 
tions of the author. Few who read the book can fail to remember 
Douglas's admonitions as a law professor that "training lawyers as 
mechanics. . . is fatal to the concept of a universityn,2 or hi concern 
that he was spending his life "teaching bright youngsters how to do 
things that should not be done".3 
The only connection between the two books, however, is that of 
Douglas's personality. The constant throughout his life was his re- 
fusal, perhaps inability, to compromise his personal or legal values. 
The disconnection is that the major theme of The Court Years is not 
the life of the author, but rather, in Douglas's own words, it is an 
attempt "to show why it was that my generation became politically 
bankrupt"? This book is political history, not biography. One is left 
at the end with no more understanding of the man than one had at 
the outset. 
But that is not to say that political-legal history is not valuable. 
For instance we see in Justice Douglas's career the influence of 
political connections, career, and values in judicial appointments; 
the second important theme of the book is the close relationship 
between the executive branch of government and the judiciary in 
the United States. Douglas's reference to judges as Nixon's men: 
Chief Justice Warren's risk of professional disapproval concomitant 
to his resignation from the American Bar Association: Justice Skelly 
Wright's aborted opportunity to be appointed to the Supreme 
Court,' President Truman's mediocre judicial appointments,8 and 
the disturbing history of judicial appointments as rewards for past 
services in at least two administrationsP are merely the most obvious 
examples of executive influence over the judiciary. The lesson to be 
learned is simply that the process of judicial appointment is likely 
2 Id., at 169. 
3 Id., at 165. 
4 THE COURT YEARS (1980) at 286. 
5 Id., at 236. 
6 Id., at 229. 
7 Id., at 127, 128. 
8 Id., at 246. 
9 Id., at 251, 252. 
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to be as central to the ultimate definition of constitutional rights in 
Canada as is the drafting of the Constitution itself. 
Yet the linkage between the executive and judiciary does not end 
with the appointment process. Justice Douglas tells us all too clearly 
of judicial conspiracies with the executive during the Cold War 
persec~tions;'~ his personal attachment to President Roosevelt dur- 
ing his years on the Bench," often as an advisor;12 his pervasive 
dislike of the Nixon administration (which ran from antitrust is- 
sues? to advocacy14 and freedom of the press'15 and the Burger/ 
Nixon connection originating in the 1950s) ;I6 and the ongoing con- 
sultation between the judiciary and the executive during the Eisen- 
hower, Roosevelt and Johnson administrations." The point here is 
that what passes for judicial independence in the United States 
Supreme Court appears, in fact, to be judicial cooperation, and 
anyone who views the judiciary as a counter-balance to the execu- 
tive, or to majoritarian values in the Canadian context, must reflect 
on the similarities between our two supreme judicial institutions. 
Recent Supreme Court Justices in Canada have had lengthy careers 
as political advisors, crown corporation chairmen, and cabinet ad- 
visors. The Ontario Court of Appeal has recently seen the appoint- 
ment of a former federal constitutional advisor, and the Federal 
Court has been graced with a Liberal member of parliament. The 
connection is obvious. 
What then is the unique political role of the Court which Justice 
Douglas obviously holds in such high esteem? In the first place, it 
allows individuals with provocative ideas and views of society, Jus- 
tice Douglas being a prime example, to express those ideas and 
shape social values in unqualified terms without risk of sanction; 
for decades, Justice Douglas's dissents expressed his unblemished 
idealism. His views as to a constitutionally entrenched absolute right 
of freedom of speech; his admission that he rarely, if ever, prosely- 
tized; never attempted to persuade other members of the Court of 
10 Id., at 102. 
11 Id., at 285. 
12 Id., at 267. 
13 Id., at 159. 
14 Id., at 179. 
15 Id., at 200. 
16 Id., at 231. 
17  Id., at 244. 
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the rightness of his views;'' his personal and legal views on the 
preservation of the natural environment;lg and his stand on capital 
punishmentZ0 suggest ideals which may not have reflected majori- 
tarian values, and certainly would not have withstood the electoral 
process from 1939 until 1975. Secondly, Justice Douglas describes 
the Court as a stabilizing influence in the ongoing transformation of 
constitutional values, simply through the relative permanence of its 
membership - a characteristic quite foreign to the political arena. 
We also see the use of constitutional law as a political tool at the 
Supreme Court, most notably in the desegregation cases epitomized 
by Brown u. Board of Education? and the use of the structural 
injunction as a remedial tool in constitutional law-making." More- 
over we see the Supreme Court, particularly in the case of constitu- 
tional decision-making, attempting to achieve a delicate balance 
between adherence to objective, perhaps historically justified, con- 
stitutional values,23 individual moral judgment," and majoritarian 
values.25 Rarely have these points been expressed so vividly. Finally, 
Justice Douglas points out that the political independence of the 
Supreme Court and of its judges is established not through the 
appointment process, nor by isolating the judiciary from govern- 
ment, but rather through constitutional protection from attempts to 
remove judges from the Bench. The next to last chapter of his auto- 
biography describes the various attempts which were made to im- 
peach his tenure at the Court; it is here that we can appreciate the 
very real significance of judicial independence. 
Perhaps the most important insights gained from the autobiogra- 
phy are those relating to the judicial process at the Supreme Court. 
A notable example is Douglas's description of the role of the Chief 
Justices, to whom an entire chapter is devoted, in structuring judi- 
cial opinion writing, and in orchestrating the work of nine very 
powerful and often intransigent men. Another is the process of Chief 
Justice appointments, in respect of which administrative ability, 
political character, social values and legal scholarship, as well as 
1s Id., at 88. 
19 Id., at 236, 282. 
~0 Id., at 390. 
21 Id., at I 13 ;  344 U.S. I ( 1952) .  
22 Id., at 123. 
23 Id., at 132. 
24 Id., at I ,  195. 
25 Id., at 145. 
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seniority, are taken into account. Another important and often over- 
looked aspect of judicial decision-making by the Supreme Court is 
that of the "first-order7' decision carried out through the leave to 
appeal process. It is here that the Court's workload is set, the num- 
ber of cases to be heard determined, and the nature of those cases 
decided upon. Very little has been written in Canada about this 
process, reasons for decisions to grant or deny leave to appeal are 
not given, and thus Justice Douglas's comments, relating for exam- 
ple to the timeliness of certiorari applications to the United States 
Supreme Court, become relevant beyond national borders. 
The book, as I said, is not biography, but rather political-legal 
history, and some of the more obvious failings in this respect should 
be briefly noted. Justice Douglas's analysis of cabinet decision-mak- 
ing in a parliamentary system of government is either outdated or 
simply inaccurate in the Canadian context.26 Another shortcoming 
is Douglas's inconsistent? and exceedingly brief analysis of his posi- 
tion on affirmative action. Finally, his abhorrance of the Nixon 
administration and the political values of those times pervades the 
biography to such an extent that one fears that he may, uncon- 
sciously, have been engaging in hyperbole.= 
To put it simply, the book is not what one might have expected 
from Mr. Justice Douglas. After waiting patiently for half a decade 
after the wonderful anecdotes and penetrating analysis of Go East, 
Young Man, we are greeted with a menagerie of chapters on dii- 
parate topics revealing nothing of the man, and little of the Court. 
The Supreme Court, like most courts in Western societies, is a secret 
institution. Cases are argued in public, but the decisions are arrived 
at in camera. And while reasons for decisions are usually given, 
there is no assurance that those published reasons reveal the true 
forces operating on the judges' intellect and emotions. It may, in 
fact, be impossible for a judge to tell us why he chose a particular 
course over another. Be that as it may, judicial autobiography offers 
the reader the opportunity to assess judicial decisions having had 
the opportunity to consider and reflect upon the extra-judicial opin- 
ions and beliefs of the judge. That is not to say that Justice Douglas 
26 Id., at 286, 287. 
3 Id., at 119, 120, 146, 147. 
28 President Nkon is the subject of comment on 65 pages throughout the book, 
as well as the subject of extensive criticism at 237-254. The topics range 
from the war in Vietnam, to environmental issues, advocacy, Chief Justice 
Burger, 'law and ordei' and desegregation, political manouverings relating 
to Chief Justice Warren's appointment and much more. 
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ought to have told us directly why he voted this way or that way on 
a particular case, or why he wrote a particular judgment. Rather, 
had he told us what he is, he would have offered his readers the 
opportunity to understand the complexities and subtleties of a par- 
ticular judicial mind and character. The first volume could not 
have fulfilled this ideal any better than it did; the second did not 
even begin the task. 
DAVID COHENT 
T Of the Faculty of Law, University of British Columbia 
@ David Cohen, 1981. 
